Argument from Motion
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skd6348:
The addition process, as defined for numbers, doesn't apply to infinity. So, both equations are meaningless in that sense.
What a bunch of BULLSHIT! skd6348 & Radical have a real problem.
1) They have to skew facts to fit their scenario.
2) They never proved their "prime mover".
3) They never proved that this "prime mover" actually moved anything.
So these god believers MUST prove their god, and prove that that god actually DID something, AND prove that their god popped into existence all by itself.
Plus if a "god" could pop into existence all by itself, it stands to reason that anything could pop into existence all itself. Thus no need for a "god" ("prime mover") at all as proven by Stephen Hawking decades ago.
1. No we don't.
2. The argument was designed to prove just that.
3. What? Of course he moved something if he has been proved to be the prime mover. The entire necessity of the existence of the prime mover is on the basis that it moves all things.
I'm really starting to think you should join our call because I don't think you're getting it through text.
That piece seems to be missing from the OP.
I've already stated that this argument is flawed because it didn't stand the test of time. Aquinas' other arguments work very well though.
RadicalWhiggery:
I'll take your opinion on the argument from motion. (Was it brought up as some kind of exercise?) As to the other 4 arguments from Aquinas, I think they are the dust of history. Certainly, they have not won over a large majority of the philosophers. Why, then, should we think that they "work very well"?
Justin wrote: "of course he moved something if he has been proved to be the prime mover." Okay Justin, you have the ball. Please demonstrate that the prime mover exists. Please prove that the prime mover is a "he". Please prove there is One prime mover rather than more than one prime mover.
Please (a) prove what it is clear now that you believe is true is in fact true... or (b) troll away. I personally hope you select option (b).
mykcob4, I'm not really a theist, at least not in the usual sense. And the prime mover isn't my argument at all...
All I'm saying is that " certain " infinities are paradoxical in reality.
ALSO, the God " popping " into existence.... Most theists don't believe God " popped " into existence at all, but that God exists eternally by necessity...
I'd say the argument from effecient causes is more helpful. And there are other arguments about the ontology of causation that require the first cause must be a mind. But I'd love to hear your argument. You say you're not a theist in the usual sense. Neither am I. I do not necessarily believe that the first cause is divine. I just think it's safe to say it exists as an omniscient mind.
All of these ontological bootstrap "proofs" concerning the nature of reality are worthless unless you buy into the premises. If you don't actually take a look at reality in selecting the premises, then they are ultimately arbitrary in a sense. Atheists certainly don't have to buy into an arbitrary premise.
@skd6348
Read Stephen Hawking.
If a god (or whatever you want to call it) exist all on its own (no matter HOW you fucking phrase it) then it stands to reason that anything can pop into existence all on its own, and therefore NO reason for a god(whatever) at all.
The need for a god is purely an abstract one to satisfy simpletons that can't get beyond not understanding that some things are not known until sufficient data is found.
Things pop into existence all on their own EVERY SINGLE FUCKING SPLIT SECOND! That is a scientific fact that has been independently verified.
Actually it doesn't.
It depends on whether the existence of the entity is necessary, OR contingent.
" Things " aren't necessary beings, but the concept of God ( is regarded ) to be a necessary truth.
So " necessary entities " can exist on their own, but contingent entities cannot.
Statements like 2+2=4 are necessary truths. Them being necessarily true doesn't justify that physical objects can simply warp without any reason at all whatsoever...
I have read Stephen Hawkings, particularly " The Grand Design ", but its argumentation it critically flawed at various levels, but right at other places.
The idea that particles can warp without any reason is not a fact. Quantum physics uses circular reasoning to deny the very foundations of its own philosophy at various levels...
BUT if it is a scientific fact that things DO pop into existence on their own, then you shouldn't have a problem with God existing eternally on its own either...
AS far as the need for a God is concerned, I myself am highly critical about many aspects in theistic philosophy. In summary, various aspects about God in classical philosophy ( like in Islam, Christianity and Judaism ) DO NOT seem necessary truths, but rather contingent. So " A mindful Creator " does not seem fully satisfactory to me as a solution to the problem coming from contingent truths... [ like in the cosmological arguments for God... ]
I was going to respond to him, but you seem to have done it very nicely. I think the cosmological arguments mainly aim to establish necessary beings. Some of them, like the Kalam, expand to establishing some aspects of the necessary being. But there are other arguments that establish more about these aspects. In your understanding, what is the flaw in the cosmological arguments?
I think the cosmological arguments work well to argue for some kind of necessity, but my problem doesn't seem with necessary entities, but rather that:
1) The set of attributes for God in classical theism(s), such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism. They seem to create paradoxes.
2) That "minds" or "beings" appear to be rather contingent themselves, rather than necessary.
Of course, cosmological arguments don't aim to establish any traditional set of attributes of God. So, (1) is a different issue, but a discussion ( on the nature of this necessary " being " ) is elsewhere important.
As far as (2) is concerned, maybe you have a different idea of " mind " or " being " as used here.
Is it possible for this "mind" or "being" to not exist?
Can abstract notions ( like time, space, magnitude, set, existence, effect, relativity,... ) be regarded as " beings "?
Can scientific laws ( like action and reaction, mathematical laws, law of non-contradiction,.. ) be regarded as " beings"?
Does " mind " refer to an integrative intelligence ( an intelligence which integrates old information with new reception of information, or which constructs new ideas from old ones )?
Does " mind " refer to some sort of information storage?
Obviously, if this "mind" is Omniscient ( in the sense of knowing absolutely everything ), it cannot be an integrative intelligence. ( It cannot learn since It knows Everything )
Maybe if the terms " mind " and " being " are more rigorously defined here, it would help...
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My basic problem appears to be that it appears palusible that a "mind", in the sense of an integrator, OR storage, of information couldn't exist at all... ( That is, it is contingent )
I mean, we may say that a necessary " mind " has to exist to avoid an infinite regression of contingencies, but if to counter that, one might argue that the Universe is ultimately the result of a physical sphere-like object...
One could answer: " A physical sphere is not a necessary being "
But what if the reply is: " A mind isn't either "
I think if a rigorous argument is made as to what makes a being necessary or not, would also be useful.
Basically, necessary entities are such that the explanation of their existence lies within themselves...
What explains such necessity of a mind?
A problem with an all-knowing mind is that it violates Einstein's special relativity. Information can't go faster than the speed of light. There would be no way for an omniscient mind to know what is going on in the far reaches of its universe.
But some theists believe God knows everything beforehand ( i.e., God knows everything about your life even before Earth was formed ).
So information doesn't have to reach God since God already knows it all.
I know, this too, doesn't make much sense but I thought I'd point it out.
Also, many theists don't believe God is physically located somewhere, so...
skd6348:
Thanks for pointing it out! I agree with your assessment. It's like a leap from the frying pan into the fire.
I'm with you up till #8 where your moniker and your message subsume the essence of the claim all god-fearing men have asked themselves to champion by the meager means and methods at their disposal.
May I?
"8. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at Blue's first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be Red.
Isn't this argument getting a little sterile? Didn't RadicalWhiggery admit that it was a flawed argument? Did I miss a retraction of that admission? So much ado over nothing!
I agree that the argument from motion is flawed. But this issue of infinites is critical to many arguments for a god.
As I pointed out in an earlier post, the operations of + and - are not defined for infinities. So, the seeming problem with I = I + 2 and I - I = 0 disappears. There is nothing to explain since they are incoherent.
But defining the problem "out" won't solve the problem.
I agree infinity isn't a number, and that is why I believe it cannot be actually "crossed".
"I=I+2 is consistent" and I-I = [ indeterminate ] are not my words. They are Nyarlathotep's.
I=I+2 is inconsistent IF operations are allowed.
If operations aren't allowed, then " I= I+2 is consistent " would still make no sense.
So I had to ask.
My view is that infinity cannot be actually "crossed".
Sets like:
N= { 1,2,3,.. }
Are merely conceptual set comprehensions. They haven't been "already completed" because their elements are not generated in time.
skd6348:
I'm not sure what the problem is anymore! I do know that the operators + and - are not defined for infinity, so any seeming contradiction in such usage doesn't mean anything. If you take one step at a time, hopping from one integer to the next as it were, going in the negative direction, then no matter how much time you spend on that journey you won't reach the end, because there is no end. In that sense I can agree that crossing an actual infinity is a problem. Infinity is subtle! You can take an infinite number of steps, each of measurable length, and only go a finite distance. You can take the set of odd numbers, and the set of all integers, and put them into a one-to-one correspondence with nothing left over in either set. Thus, they have the same "number" of elements! Even more surprising, Euclidean 3-D space can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with a straight line with nothing left over in either set!
The problem seems to be that:
1) All finite sets obey the following:
[ [ (A-B) != {} ] ^ [ (x is in B) => (x is in A) ] ] => |B|<|A|
All finite sets also obey:
[There exists 1:1 from A to B] ^ [There exists 1:1 from B to A] => |A| = |B|
But in infinite sets, holding BOTH often leads to logical contradictions.
A= {1,2,3,4,5,... }
B={1,3,5,... }
Now:
A-B= {2,4,... } != {}
A has all the members of B, and yet more members. So how can their "cardinality" be equal?
It needs to be addressed as to why we should abandon the first axiom ( or theorem ), and keep the second.
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2) Temporal series of events are much different than a conceptual infinite iterator, such as the set of integers.
a) Temporal series of events don't seem have a "backward" infinite potential. Every "next" event is explainable by the " previous " event, and not the other way around. It is not same as infinite potential, in the negative direction, of integers.
The set of past events refers to a set of events that have "already" happened. If its cardinality is not a finite value, then would it mean infinity has been actually "crossed"?
b) Graphs like y=f(x) would, theoretically, stretch infinitely both ways. But that is not a temporal series of cause and effect...
At any point, the value of y is independent of any of its previous values.
The value of y, at any point, depends upon the value of x at that SAME point, and the equation y=f(x), and nothing else.
On the contrary, the contingent details of any object, at any moment ( in a temporal sequence of events), are caused, and explainable, by the contingent details of past events.
Any constructive criticism would be appreciated.
skd6348:
I would first note that if subtraction and addition are not defined for an infinite set then the contradiction goes away.
I would also note that any jump over an actual infinity must either start with "infinity" or end with "infinity," which would be impossible since infinity is not a point in time. So, the whole concept of having to jump over infinity seems dubious.
Another interesting point is the assumption that nothing preceded the cosmos. At first glace it seems rather obvious for a temporally finite cosmos, but is it really? It seems to be a dubious assumption about what "nothing" is in the real world. You certainly can't point to a philosophical nothing since it can't occupy space. Nature is under no obligation to conform to our idea of "nothing." What if empty space of some kind and quantum fluctuations are as empty as reality can get? In that case, nature could never go below that bottom floor, meaning that with respect to our definition of a philosophical "nothing," something would always have existed. Here, we are no long constrained to steps of time, and the infinity problem that you see just doesn't apply. Yet, the cosmos would still be finite in that nothing preceded it, only this nothing can give rise to something.
Greensnake:
"I would first note that if subtraction and addition are not defined for an infinite set then the contradiction goes away."
What kind of addition and subtraction? If you are talking about adding, or removing, the members of one set into, or from, another set, where at least one of them is infinite, then such operations are well defined in set theory.
For instance,
A={1,2,3,4,5,... } [ Set of all natural numbers ]
B={-1,0}
C={1,2,3}
D={...,-2,-1,0 }
A+B= { -1,0,1,2,... }
A-C= {4,5,6,7,...}
A+D= {..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ... } [ Set of all integers ]
Of course, if "-" is not defined for infinite sets, then the axiom:
[ [ (A-B) != {} ] ^ [ (x is in B) => (x is in A) ] ] => |B|<|A|
becomes incoherent, and cannot be true.
However, any "ruling" out of operations needs justification. Currently, it is accepted to use such operations in examples like above.
Our set of interest is the " set of past events ''.
Let t=0 be the current time, and P(t=0) the corresponding set of past events.
After two steps, something is definitely added to P.
Let the new set be P(t=2), and the two new events A and B.
Now, P(t=2) = P(t=0) + {A,B}
Now, if |P(t=2)| = |P(t=0)|, then this contradicts:
[ [ (A-B) != {} ] ^ [ (x is in B) => (x is in A) ] ] => |B|<|A|
If we, instead, say that cardinality does not apply to infinite sets, then both this axiom and;
[There exists 1:1 from A to B] ^ [There exists 1:1 from B to A] => |A| = |B|
Would become incoherent, and hence the problem wouldn't persist. Though this seems a little dubious, since P(t=2) is, in at least some sense, more than P(t=0).
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Greensnake:
"I would also note that any jump over an actual infinity must either start with "infinity" or end with "infinity," which would be impossible since infinity is not a point in time. So, the whole concept of having to jump over infinity seems dubious."
That is my viewpoint as well. It seems dubious to " actually" cross infinity.
Though if the Universe has " undergone " ( as in, already gone through ) an endless series of past events, that would mean crossing infinity...?
My point 2(a) in the previous post points that temporal series of cause and effect seem "forward", so a forward potential infinite is plausible, but a backward one is dubious. This is an additional issue which makes the "set of past events" different from many other sets.
Greensnake:
"Another interesting point is the assumption that nothing preceded the cosmos. At first glace it seems rather obvious for a temporally finite cosmos, but is it really? It seems to be a dubious assumption about what "nothing" is in the real world. You certainly can't point to a philosophical nothing since it can't occupy space. Nature is under no obligation to conform to our idea of "nothing." What if empty space of some kind and quantum fluctuations are as empty as reality can get? In that case, nature could never go below that bottom floor, meaning that with respect to our definition of a philosophical "nothing," something would always have existed. Here, we are no long constrained to steps of time, and the infinity problem that you see just doesn't apply. Yet, the cosmos would still be finite in that nothing preceded it, only this nothing can give rise to something."
I'm not sure what you mean here. If the cosmos really is "temporally" finite, then nothing would, by definition, precede it "temporally".
We can't point to philosophical nothing, because there is nothing to point to. Empty space is a form of emptiness, but not philosophical nothing.
But absolute emptiness means the absence of everything, not just physical objects, but conceptually empty space, time, natural laws, mind, sentience, abstract notions or Gods and such...
I don't think such nothingness was ever there. I also doubt that all fundamental natural laws, particularly those of mathematics and physics, could be created in any case. [ This could lead to various logical paradoxes about the Creator itself, so I don't find a Creator Mind a satisfactory solution to this problem. ]
Empty space and quantum fluctuations are not absolutely nothing. If we define " philosophical nothing " as such, this would commit equivocation.
If quantum fluctuations initiated a "finite cosmos", then technically it's invalid to say that nothing preceded the cosmos. [ Quantum fluctuations did ]
When did the prime mover first start atoms and photons moving? Oops! Trick question. Atoms and photons have no prime mover since they cannot be still.
The concept of the "prime mover" assumes a first mover where motion is measured against a fixed, universal background. Unfortunately for Aquinas, Einstein blew all that away with his Special Relativity! Motion requires at least two frames of reference, two objects moving with respect to one another. Moreover, you can't say that one object is moving and the other is not. It's all relative to the observer. Therefore, the very concept of a "Prime Mover" is blown away!
Argument from magic is more like it. The Prime Magician.
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